discussion to the point where equity is adequately defined. Are we talking about equity in access to care, in the use of services, in the financing of care, or some combination of these possibilities? The time is past due to bring greater specificity and more analytic rigour to the issue of decentralization, to identify the specific mechanisms by which it improves equity and other societal goals and objectives, and in measuring its impact. This article assesses the performance and equity in financing of decentralized user fee systems in Honduras. The unavailability of baseline data about the equity of the system precludes being able to assess the impact of decentralization. The goal here, therefore, is much more modest: it is simply to demonstrate that even in a system that has been decentralized there are substantial problems, including ones of equity. It is only by more closely investigating decentralization efforts that we will come to understand the critical factors, conditions and mechanisms that must be taken into account in the design and implementation of successful decentralization initiatives.
User fee systems: a common developmental pattern and its equity implications
Public sector fees for health services have existed in most countries of the developing world for many years now (Fiedler 1993; Nolan and Turbat 1995; Russell and Gilson 1995; Gilson 1997) . In many countries, however, these systems are informal and have developed in a haphazard, locally led manner, frequently because 'nobody' in the Ministry of Health (MOH), the Ministry of Finance or other government agencies has been willing to take on the difficult political issue of charging for care (Fiedler 1999) . This has been the experience of many, especially Latin American, countries, including Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Honduras. These systems have commonly developed because resourcestrapped MOH providers have felt compelled to mobilize additional resources to supplement their inadequate level of government financing; most commonly, in order to purchase additional drugs. While some analysts, looking at where the decision-making locus rests, might characterize such systems as decentralized, this is misleading since these user fee systems have never been centralized. Moreover, labelling them 'decentralized' runs the risk of their being agnostically accepted as desirable and good -like decentralization, in general -and concomitantly dismissing any question about how well they are functioning as being irrelevant or of secondary importance.
The taproot of many of these systems, however, suggests otherwise. The presumption that local political and administrative arenas are likely to be more free of bureaucratic hurdles, and that local agents are more likely to have more accurate knowledge about their neighbours' income and ability to pay for health care, has encouraged many health system analysts to argue that these locally led systems are somehow inherently good or at least preferable to a national scheme. The resulting quiescence and acquiescence that has evolved about these systems -both in low-and middleincome countries and within the international health community -has been reinforced in many countries by the desire to (continue to) eschew the politically unpopular issue of developing a national user fee policy. Indeed, cynics may say that it is the desire to avoid having to address the contentious issue of developing a national user fee policy that has prompted some to accept these locally developed systems as being as good as can be done. But are they?
User fee systems that have developed from local initiatives are generally facility-specific and idiosyncratic. If the MOH has not provided any guidance on, or a framework for, or an explicit, official national user fee policy, or it has chosen not to enforce whatever official system may exist, then the sum total of these idiosyncratic local systems is, by default, the de facto MOH user fee system. While they may be relatively equitable at the facility level, or even at the next highest administrative level of the MOH (e.g. the health area or region), how equitable are they in the aggregate, i.e. nationally? There are several levels and criteria by which user fee systems can be assessed:
• each individual local system can be evaluated (which has apparently been the focus, albeit implicit, of most decentralization analyses to date), and • the sum total of these systems can be evaluated by:
• individual patient income level, • geographic area, and • level or type of facility.
Contrary to the general presumption that such locally led user fee systems are more equitable, as judged from a national perspective it would seem that just the opposite would, in fact, be the general rule; i.e. that they would be less equitable. This is suggested by two considerations. First, locales with more resources are likely to spend more on health, resulting in more health care services for persons living in wealthier areas. The second consideration is a common result of the interaction of public health care economics and politics. The administrators and directors of higher tiered facilitiesnational hospitals vis-à-vis regional hospitals, hospitals vis-à-vis health centres and health centres vis-à-vis health posts -are more likely to be more politically savvy and better able to garner more resources. Particularly in the resourcescarce world that has plagued MOHs throughout the world in the last 30 years, they are likely to obtain disproportionately large budget allocations, and in MOH-wide medicine and supply systems that are demand-driven or 'pull' systems, they are likely to obtain disproportionately large shares of the Ministry's supplies. The result is that the lower tiered facilities are likely to be the least adequately financed, the least adequately stocked. Hence, the MOH providers working at these facilities are more likely to feel more compelled to establish user fee systems, to levy user fees and to charge relatively higher user fees. To the extent that they do so, it provides the wrong signals to consumers who are then financially motivated to bypass the relatively more expensive lower-tiered facilities -the health posts and health centresand to go to the hospitals. This is likely to result in horizontal and vertical inequities. First, because the lower tiered facilities, particularly the health posts, are more likely to be located in the poorer rural areas of the country, this results in vertical inequities: poorer people are paying relatively more for care. Secondly, it results in horizontal inequities because health facilities of the same type may have very different set fee levels for providing the same type of care to people of the same health status. In fact the situation is likely to be even worse, as it is likely that poorer people are paying more for lower quality care of a health post -usually provided by a nurse auxiliary -than the less poor are paying for the care they obtain from a health centre or a hospital, where care is generally provided by a physician.
These two considerations -wealthier people purchasing more health care and having greater access to and use of services, and the lower-tiered facilities being more likely to have to charge for care and charging relatively more for care -demonstrate why decentralization may not result in greater equity or in the development of user fee systems, which when considered as a whole may have other serious shortcomings. This, of course, is not to suggest that decentralization, per se, does not or cannot result in greater equity or in an otherwise well-functioning user fee system. Nor is it meant to convey the impression that the decentralization of user fee systems is not something desirable or is necessarily incompatible with equity. Rather, it is simply a call for greater scepticism, fewer presumptions and for more circumspect and rigorous analysis of the design, implementation and impact of decentralization efforts. The tools are available for more carefully analyzing and assessing decentralization and decentralized user fee systems. What is generally needed is a more careful analysis of experiences so that we are better able to understand how changing user fee systems, resource allocation patterns and decentralization change incentive structures, and with them, the degree of equity in access to and use of health care services, and in health care financing. The discussion now turns to an analysis of the performance and equity of the user fee system of the MOH of Honduras.
The Honduran context
Located in the isthmus of Central America, Honduras has a population of 6.3 million, with a per capita income of US$760 (World Bank 2001) . The MOH's infrastructure consists of seven national hospitals, six regional hospitals, 16 health area hospitals, 254 health centres with physicians (referred to by their Spanish acronym as CESAMOs), 848 health posts (labelled CESARs and staffed by nurse auxiliaries), and 26 other types of facilities. In 1998, the entire health care system of Honduras produced an average of 2.1 ambulatory visits per person, slightly above the World Health Organization's benchmark for a country's minimum acceptable consultation rate. Fifty-nine per cent of Hondurans turn to the MOH for at least a portion of their health care needs (Fiedler 2001) .
The establishment of a Honduran national policy, 1990
User fees have been charged in some Honduran MOH facilities since the 1950s, shortly after the Ministry was established. The first systems were individual facilityspecific, generally begun on the initiative of the director of the facility. Some of these extra-legal systems -those that were in hospitals -were given legal recognition in 1984 when the Minister of Health issued an executive order mandating MOH hospitals to collect at minimum 30% of their total financial resources from user fee charges within 5 years. That goal, however, was never achieved, for once the existence of these systems was recognized in the eyes of the State they came under the purview of the Ministry of the Treasury which required that all user fee revenues redound to the Treasury, sapping the incentive of hospital directors to collect the fees. The MOH's interest in user fees soon subsided, and they quietly resumed their facility-specific character, each with its own idiosyncratic mode of operations. A few years later, in 1990, a comprehensive national user fee policy, The Regulation and Manual for Recovered Funds (referred to hereafter as the RMRF, or simply the Regulation), was enacted.
The passage of the RMRF marked a break from the past. It constituted a new, more earnest and more comprehensive attempt to establish a national user fee system, but one that devolved much authority from the central office to the regional offices and that fostered further decentralization of control over user fees to the community level. It established national norms of operations and structure, but decentralized administration to the MOH's nine regional offices, and provided considerable latitude and encouragement for community participation. Thus, at once, it extended the authority of the central government, while promoting decentralization. The implementation and adherence to the RMRF have never been examined. Now, more than a decade since its passage, there are growing concerns about various shortcomings in the user fee system, which have sparked the call for this assessment.
The RMRF
The RMRF sets forth the rules and regulations governing the structure and operations of MOH user fee systems: it establishes specific, nominal lempira-denominated prices and restrictions on the use of revenues, provides a framework of rules and reporting requirements, and identifies and assigns specific management, accounting and supervisory responsibilities to specific MOH positions or designees. In exchange for agreeing to track revenues and provide official Ministry of the Treasury-issued receipts to payers, the Treasury agreed that these revenues could remain with the facilities or elsewhere within the MOH.
The RMRF states that 'all MOH facilities . . . will charge the established tariff for services that are provided to the public' (page 10), and provides specific guidance with respect to the levels of user fees and some charging practices. For instance, it:
• identifies six health services that are to be provided free-ofcharge -immunization, prenatal care, growth and development, family planning, and treatment of tuberculosis and of sexually transmitted diseases; • identifies categories of patients who should be provided care at reduced fees, or entirely free-of-charge -the poor and active community health personnel; • establishes specific prices, which vary by type of facility, for specific services (drugs and other supplies are not charged for separately).
In addition, the Regulation decentralizes the administration of the system to the Ministry's nine regional offices, and states that user fee levels 'will be revised periodically' by the individual National, Regional and Area Hospitals and CESAMOs with 'pre-approval of the Central Level and in agreement with the level of care provided and the socioeconomic situation of the community'. A major shortcoming of the RMRF is that it does not explicitly state how fee levels should be revised or with what minimum frequency, and it did not assign any position or unit within the MOH Central Level with the authority or responsibility for revising fee levels.
The RMRF also establishes specific rules regulating the use of the revenues generated, including the requirement that revenues must be deposited in a State-owned bank account, the prohibition of spending their revenues on personnel, and several regulations that identify nominal lempira-specified maximum amounts of user fee revenues that may be retained at the facility or that may be used to purchase different types of inputs without being subject to other central government purchasing regulations. The RMRF makes no mention about periodically updating these regulations.
In sum, the Regulation established appropriate incentives for the MOH to collect user fees, it tiered prices in a way that provided appropriate incentives for patients to use the MOH infrastructure in the way it was intended, it promoted community participation and devolved the authority to oversee and administer the fees to regional offices. It was able to do all of this only by centralizing a system that up until then had consisted of a host of idiosyncratic, facility-level systems.
The current Honduran reality and the motivation for the study
Three types of user fee systems are found in MOH facilities. The principal focus of the RMRF is the official MOH user fee system -known as the 'institutional system' -which is found in 26% of MOH facilities. The RMRF also allows for the development of another user fee system, one that is operated and controlled by the 'community', and is referred to as the 'community system'. Forty-three per cent of MOH facilities have a community system, making this the most common type of user fee system, and 10% have some type of combination of institutional and community systems, so-called 'mixed' systems. One-fifth of MOH facilities, primarily auxiliary nurse-staffed rural health centres (CESARs), do not have a user fee system. Although the RMRF recognizes the legitimacy of the community systems, it does not provide guidance about a community system's structure or operating procedures. The only requirement for a community system is that it is operated by a 'community health board'. The Regulation, however, does not stipulate what such a board is, how it should be formed or how it should function. The community systems are not required to adhere to the RMRF, and are not required to report to, and are not monitored by, any MOH or other Central Government entity. By allowing for their considerably greater independence, the Regulation encourages the formation of community systems. It is widely recognized that these systems have been growing in number in recent years, yet until this study there has been only anecdotal information about the number, structure, operations and financial significance of these independent, decentralized systems.
There are three organizational structures by which communities participate in the operations and governance of MOH facilities: community health boards, patronato health committees and municipal health committees. The community health boards are autonomous organizations that have usually been formed as the result of a special local (village) election to provide general support to a particular health facility. Sixty-two per cent of the surveyed facilities have a community health board. One quarter of the surveyed facilities have a municipal health committee that is part of the municipal government, and about one-fifth have a patronato health committee. Patronato committees are formed on the initiative of private individuals. The RMRF discusses only the potential role of a community health board. No mention is made of the municipal health committee or more generally of the municipality, which is the focus of the Government's decentralization initiatives. The centerpiece of the Government's municipalization efforts is a 1999 law establishing that municipalities are to annually receive 5% of the total tax income of the Central Government. According to a highranking official of the Ministry of Finance, at present, only about 60% of Honduras' 298 municipalities are regarded as having adequate administrative capacity and thus are the recipients of these funds.
The RMRF, which has not been modified since 1990, still constitutes the official MOH user fee policy. For several years there have been growing concerns about the shortcomings of the Ministry's user fee system. Although the implementation of the Regulation has never been assessed, accumulating anecdotal evidence suggests that the system is plagued by numerous, widespread deficiencies, including:
• marked regional variations in administrative systems;
• inconsistent exoneration policies which may constitute a barrier to access to care (i.e. vertical inequities); • marked variations in the fee levels of a given service provided in the same type of facility (i.e. horizontal inequities); • a price structure which varies across facility types in such a way as to provide the wrong signals to consumers, encouraging the bypassing of more physically accessible, less costly to provide, lower tiers of care; • it fosters the inefficient use and delivery of MOH care, and it has not been an effective cost recovery tool or generated significant resources.
The Regulation established a user fee system that is decentralized to the regional level and constituted one of the pioneering steps in the decentralization of the Honduran state. The region-based scheme, however, is not in accordance with what subsequently became the Government of Honduras' (GOH) general approach to decentralization. That approach is focused on the municipality, and municipalization has become the most important theme guiding the GOH's efforts to modernize the state. The December 1999 modifications in the Law of Municipalities established a federal revenue sharing system. Each year the municipalities are to receive 5% of the total tax income of the Central Government. Four per cent of the 5% is to be distributed equally among the municipalities, with the remainder allocated in proportion to population. It is widely reported that a substantial proportion of these monies is spent on health. As opposed to setting up new, distinct systems, however, the funds have generally been used to augment local MOH facilities' supplies, hire additional personnel and sometimes refurbish buildings.
There is no information system that reports how these monies are expended.
Study design and methodology
The development of the design for this study was a two-step process. The first step consisted of a series of interviews with officials at all levels of the MOH to become knowledgeable about the legal framework, as well as the general characteristics, operating procedures and any commonly construed problems of the user fee system. The intent was to design the study so as to ensure that relevant empirical data would be assembled to enable thorough understanding of the current user fee systems, while also being sure that alternative potential reforms or modifications of the systems could be identified and investigated. This attempt to envision and explore alternative potential future realities was guided by stated goals and objectives of the GOH and the MOH, most importantly the promotion of decentralization and community participation. Hence, the study design was shaped to a significant extent by the desire to have information about the community systems and community participation.
This phase of the study culminated with the development and application of the user fee inventory questionnaire. This questionnaire was used in interviews with regional office personnel and health area chiefs to develop an inventory of the type of user fee system (institutional, community or combined) in each individual health facility in the country. This was the first inventory of user fee systems ever assembled in Honduras. The questionnaire was also used to collect information about characteristics of each facility that were hypothesized to affect the amount of user fee revenues generated by the facility. This information was essential to the development of a sampling frame that could be used to develop a representative sample of facilities that would be surveyed to develop reliable, national level estimates of revenues in the community user fee systems.
Phase two of the study design consisted of: analysis of the user fee system inventory; the development and application of a sampling methodology; identifying the sample of facilities to be surveyed; the design of specific questionnaires for (1) MOH facilities, (2) the MOH regional offices; and, to gather information about community participation and local level views of the systems, there were questionnaires for (3) community health boards, and (4) a representative of the municipal government (the mayor's office, alcalde).
One hundred and eighty-five facility interviews were conducted between January 2000 and April 2000, including 86 CESARs, 71 CESAMOs and 28 hospitals. The sample of community health boards and mayors' offices surveyed was derivative of the facility survey. Representatives of 82 health committees and 53 mayors' offices were interviewed. Finally, all nine MOH regional offices were surveyed. There were a total of 330 interviews.
A variety of archival data, including MOH service provision and institutional user fee revenue data for each facility in the sample for 1995-1999, were also assembled and analyzed, as well as the health component of a 1998 national household income and expenditure survey.
The focus of the study is fees for outpatient care. The structure and level of these fees vary by type of facility. In some instances they consist of a single, all-inclusive fee. In other instances, there are separate fees for different services (such as laboratory or X-rays). The standard practice in all facilities is that the charge for the consultation also covers any medicines that may have been provided. The reader is cautioned to note that section 4 of the 'Findings' includes a longitudinal analysis of the level of all user fee revenues -those derived from both inpatient and outpatient care. This was unavoidable as the only longitudinal data available on user fee revenues was the total for all care that is reported to the MOH's central office as a lump sum. Thus, the discussion about trends in revenue generation includes revenues from inpatient-as well as outpatient-provided goods and services.
Findings
The number and types of user fee systems
As Table 1 shows, the type of user fee system varies systematically by type of facility. All three tiers of hospitals -national, regional and area -have exclusively institutional systems. Ninety per cent of CESAMOs have a user fee system, and about two-thirds of these have an institutional system. Seventy-six per cent of CESARs have a user fee system, 75% of which are community systems.
User fee levels, exonerations and incentives
As may be seen in Figure 1 , in both user fee systems, MOH user fee levels are low. The average institutional fee system price of a general consultation in the surveyed facilities is 2.2 lempiras, equivalent to just 0.018% of the average Honduran per capita income (World Bank 2001). 1 Average prices in community fee systems are significantly higher than those of institutional systems in both CESAMOs and CESARs: 3.40 versus 1.93 and 3.05 versus 2.21, respectively.
Community systems, which are most commonly found in CESARs where care is provided by a nurse auxiliary, have generally higher average prices than institutional systems, which are more commonly found in higher levels of facilities where care is generally provided by a physician. While this study did not estimate the cost of care provision, there is little doubt that the cost of care provided by a nurse auxiliary in a CESAR with a community fee system is less expensive than that provided by a physician in a higher level of facility with an institutional system. Thus, users of CESARs are paying more for less costly care, and thus paying a higher proportion of the cost of their care than are the users of the higher levels of care. This is inequitable from a 'benefits-received' perspective. Moreover, since CESARs vis-à-vis CESAMOs are generally located in more remote areas where incomes are likely to be lower, it is also likely that the incidence of user fees is vertically inequitable, i.e. that poorer persons pay more in both absolute and relative (to income) terms.
Average institutional system prices vary across different types of facilities in such a way that it encourages would-be patients to use the pyramidal referral system inappropriately. Average fee levels in a CESAR are equal to the MOH average and higher than in a CESAMO, and they are higher in a CESAMO than in a national hospital (Figure 1 ). These user fee levels are providing the wrong signals to would-be patients, and encourage the inefficient use of MOH services, and thus the inefficient provision of services by the MOH.
(Honduras does not have a system of differential fees that might offset these perverse incentives such that persons who Source: Authors' analysis of data from a special, unpublished survey conducted by the Planning and Management Evaluation Unit of the MOH in conjunction with this study (Fiedler et al. 2000) . choose to 'bypass' their local facility in order to obtain care at higher tiered facilities are charged more.)
It should be noted that with the current low level of fees, the magnitude of the impact of these different fee levels on both patient behaviour and equity may not be very great. However, with the MOH actively discussing and apparently intent on increasing fee levels, these observations and their implications should not be dismissed. These are important lessons and principles that should be used to inform any future modifications that might be introduced in the structure of fees.
According to data from the 1998 National Household Income and Expenditures Survey, the likelihood of paying for an ambulatory acute curative care visit at an (any) MOH facility is 79%. As may be seen in black and white-checked columns in Figure 2 , the probability is highest for persons using CESAMOs (89%) and CESARs (87%), and lowest for those using a hospital (64%). Thus the relative rates at which persons are exempted from payment at the different levels of MOH care are also encouraging the inefficiency of the Ministry.
The relative likelihood of paying for care and relative fee levels both contribute to more services being demanded and provided at hospitals relative to the CESAMOs and CESARs than would be the case with a more appropriate price structure. This perverse incentive structure exacerbates congestion at the hospitals and CESAMOs and increases MOH costs. Moreover, it has probably contributed to the 35% increase in the share of all hospital ambulatory care provided in the emergency department between 1994/95 and 1997/98 (when it reached 31%, more than three times the Pan American Health Organization-recommended maximum of 10%).
Figure 2 also contains data on the proportion of patients who pay at each type of facility by household income quintile.
Persons from the poorest one-fifth of households (Quintile 1) are more likely to have to pay for care than the average patient at national hospitals, area hospitals, CESAMOs and CESARs, and are just as likely to have to pay at regional hospitals. In fact, the lowest quintile is the quintile with the highest probability of paying for care at all of the MOH facility types, with the exception of regional hospitals.
Persons from the poorest one-fifth of households also incur a greater relative burden in paying MOH user fees than the average MOH patient. Figure 3 presents the average user fee payments as a percentage of household income multiplied by 100 for each income quintile. Only the poorest fifth of the population pays a higher proportion of its income than the allquintiles-average of 6.3, and it pays more than twice this amount. In contrast, the highest income quintile pays about one-quarter of the proportion of its income that the poorest income quintile pays. 2
While it merits reiterating that the level of outpatient fees paid at present is not great (though this is not the case with inpatient care fees -see endnote 2), these findings are, nevertheless, startling. Moreover, there is a need to increase MOH outpatient fee levels as soon as possible, and with higher fees will come the increased likelihood that fees will come to constitute an obstacle to obtaining care unless the Ministry improves the way in which the fees are administered.
The legacy of the RMRF's ill-defined responsibilities
As already noted, the Regulation calls for periodic revisions of price levels by the individual national, regional and area hospitals and CESAMOs, with 'pre-approval of the Central Level and in agreement with the level of care provided and the socioeconomic situation of the community' (page 5). CESARs are not included in the list, suggesting that their fees will remain constant, in perpetuity. Another section of the regulation (page 10), states that 'all MOH facilities, with the exception of health centers with community systems, will charge for services that are provided to the public at the established tariff (which will be revised periodically by the competent entity of the MOH)'. The ambiguous wording 'competent entity of the MOH' is a source of confusion and uncertainty. In the judgement of many MOH officials and staff, it is the regional office that has the authority for changing prices, though others (citing the previous quotation) say it is the responsibility of the central level. The Regulation does not, however, specify what office or position in the MOH central office is supposed to pass judgement on proposed user fee changes. The uncertainty about who has the authority to revise fee levels has been an obstacle to their being changed.
More than half of the surveyed facilities with institutional fee systems have never changed their prices since their system was first established, on average, more than 10 years ago. On average, community system prices change more often and have been changed more recently than institutional system prices. In the 78 facilities in which institutional user fee levels were increased at least once in the past 4 years, a facilityspecific review of service delivery statistics found no evidence that the price increases deterred utilization. Excluding the 19% who responded 'don't know' from the calculation, 62% of all of the surveyed facilities identified the regional office as an obstacle to their changing their fee levels. Four of the nine regional office interviewees stated that prices in their respective regions have never changed either because the RMRF does not permit changes or because it is the central office that determines prices. These responses indicate ignorance about the authority and responsibility of the regional office in initiating user fees hikes, suggesting that regional offices may inadvertently be obstacles to increasing user fee levels.
The vagaries and ambiguities of the RMRF are exacerbated by the high general level of ignorance about the Regulation. Only about one-quarter of the surveyed facilities reported that they knew about the official MOH user fee policy, the RMRF. Clearly, the MOH needs to better publicize and make its staff aware of and knowledgeable about official user fee policy. This is the first order of business in getting the user fee systems to function more as intended.
While the RMRF decentralizes the administration of the user fee systems to the regional offices, by not providing adequate guidance it grants them considerable discretion in structuring and operating the system. The responses of the regional offices have been highly variable. The amount of staff, time and other resources they devote to monitoring and supervising the fee systems in their regions varies substantially. Some regions have several members of staff who are dedicated to administering the system, while for other regional offices it is simply one of several activities for which a single individual is responsible. Some regional offices do a consistently poor job of administering the institutional systems. Most glaringly, one regional office described the institutional user fee systems in 71% of its facilities as 'sporadic', raising questions about their integrity. Another regional office says the institutional systems have been replaced with community systems, and it (the regional office) therefore has no oversight responsibilities. Yet, there are relatively few community health boards that supervise the community fee systems in the region, and this is the singular criterion required by the RMRF to establish a community system. It would appear that the goals of 'community participation' and 'decentralization' are used as euphemisms to hide the fact that a regional office is abdicating its responsibilities.
There is also great diversity within the regions and across regions in the level and types of fees and fee systems, as well as in exoneration policies and the role and degree of involvement in, and oversight by, the regional offices. While institutional fee systems have ostensibly been regulated by the RMRF for more than 10 years, the degree of adherence to the Regulation varies substantially by region, by type of facility and, it appears, over time. While a user fee system should be flexible enough to allow the expression of local needs, Hondurans are ill served by a system that is made up of a patchwork of inconsistent, irrational, idiosyncratic decentralized systems. Rather than establishing broad parameters of a national system and identifying the ways in which local authorities may modify the system to meet their specific needs, the MOH Central Office has been a passive, acquiescent observer. 3
Stagnant levels of real income and the low cost recovery performance of institutional user fee systems 4 As already noted, the Regulation does not provide any means for modifying the specific, nominal lempira-denominated regulations established in 1990, and they are still extant today.
Since the Regulation was enacted into law, Honduras has had an average annual rate of inflation of 22%. As a result, by the end of 1999, the real value of the prices had fallen to about one-fifth of their real value in 1990, and these regulations have come to impose an ever-increasing administrative burden and cost. To re-establish the real levels of these regulations would require raising their nominal levels to those shown in the right-hand column of Table 2 .
Inflation has also eroded the value of the revenues generated. Although total nominal institutional user fee revenues grew by an annual average of 21% from 1996 to 1999, when the impact of inflation is taken into account, the increase in user fees over the entire 4-year period is only 13%, and varies substantially by type of facility, as may be seen in Figure 4 . Between 1996 and 1999 only the national and regional hospitals enjoyed increases in their real institutional user fee income. In real terms, the national hospitals' 1999 revenues were 142% and the regional hospitals' were 116% of their respective 1996 levels. In contrast, the area hospitals' were 6% less and the Regions' (here defined as only the CESAMOs and CESARs) had fallen to 89% of their level 3 years earlier. Moreover, the relative significance of institutional user fee revenues has been and remains modest.
Institutional system revenues as a proportion of total Central Government-funded MOH expenditures have remained small, hovering around 2%.
Changing levels of service provision do not help to explain these changing levels of real institutional user fee revenues. Table 3 presents the MOH's service provision levels from 1996 to 1999. The national hospitals, which experienced the biggest increases in real user fee revenues, had the largest contraction in outpatient visits of any type of MOH facility, and they were the only type of MOH hospital to have a reduction in the number of discharges. Quantity of services provided does not seem to provide much insight into the falling real revenue generation of the CESAMOs and CESARs either. While their real revenues dropped from 3.8 to 3.4 million lempiras, the number of visits they provided jumped 31%, with CESARs averaging an average annual growth rate of 11% and CESAMOs 8% (owing in large part to growth in the number of facilities). Thus, the magnitude of the impact of inflation on the real revenues of the user fee systems of the CESARs and CESAMOs has more than offset the increased nominal lempiras that have been generated by increasing levels of service provision, leaving the real value of user fee revenues lower in 1999 than in 1996.
Nor do changes in the mix of services provided seem to help explain the trends in real user fee revenues. The proportion of all services provided that comprise the six MOH priority services mandated by the Ministry to be provided free-ofcharge (immunization, prenatal care, growth and development, family planning, tuberculosis and sexually transmitted diseases) has not changed appreciably. These services have consistently constituted 35-37% of all outpatient visits from 1996 to 1999, and their relative importance in the case mix of each type of MOH facility has remained relatively unchanged. Moreover, few MOH facilities are in complete compliance with the MOH mandate to provide all six of these priority services free-of-charge. While most do not charge for some subset of the six services, relatively few facilities do not levy fees for one or more of them. None of the national and area hospitals, for example, provides all six services free-ofcharge. The CESARs are the other extreme; i.e. the facility type most likely to be in complete compliance with this mandate. Even among them, however, only 24% report that they do not charge for any of the services. 5 In sum, the decline in CESARs' and CESAMOs' real user fee revenues is attributable to the persistence of a high rate of inflation throughout the 1996-99 period, coupled with generally fixed levels of fees.
It appears that the real revenue increases of the national and regional hospitals have been chiefly due to the proliferation of fees for different types of services and the 'unbundling' of fees and services, especially for inpatient care. Whereas these hospitals once charged a single, all-inclusive fee for a day in the hospital or an outpatient visit, they now levy separate charges for medicines, laboratory examinations, use of the operating room, anaesthesia, and other ancillary services and supplies.
In summary, the Ministry's institutional user fee system has never been an effective tool for generating income and defraying costs, and its performance continues to falter. With the majority of facilities never having changed their prices and holding their regional offices responsible for not allowing them to increase their fees, coupled with several of the regional offices being unaware of their having first-line responsibility for authorizing increases in fee levels, much of the MOH is stuck in a dysfunctional and self-perpetuating situation, the end result of which is largely stagnant real levels of user fee revenues, even while the Ministry has posted impressive increases in the amount of services it provides.
Institutional user fee administrative costs and net revenue generation
The administrative costs of the institutional user fee system in 1999 are estimated at 23 million lempiras. 6 The bulk of these are facility-level costs that were identified and estimated with data from the facility questionnaires. The questionnaires asked about the amount of time devoted to various user fee system-related activities, including fee collecting, receipt writing, record keeping and travelling to the regional office (most CESARs and CESAMOs are required by their regional office to deposit their user fee revenues once or twice a month). Data on the salaries of these persons was also collected, as was the source of the funds used to pay them. The usual arrangement in a CESAR was that the nurse auxiliary devoted about 20% of her time to these activities. In CESAMOs, the norm was to have a full-time staff-person who served as the cashier and handled most of the other user fee system-related activities, as well. Where CESAMOs did not have a full-time cashier, they usually had another staff, usually a nurse auxiliary, who devoted 75% of his/her time to administering the user fee system. The situation in the hospitals varied substantially by the size of the hospital. The most common arrangement was to have a three-or four-person team consisting of a cashier or two, an assistant accountant and a social worker. These personnel costs constituted 81% of the estimated total costs of the administrative system. The MOH pays the salaries of 52% of the 869 staff operating these systems. Others are paid by a variety of sources, including the health board and other community organizations and municipal authorities.
Other costs that were included in the calculation were the personnel costs of the regional offices that supervise these systems (obtained from each regional office in a structured interview), as well as the cost of two MOH central office personnel and a Ministry of Finance analyst, all of whom monitor the flow of user fee funds. In addition, the costs of transporting the receipts and funds from the facilities to the regional offices was estimated, as were the costs of the official Ministry of Finance receipt booklets that are used in all facilities.
Twenty-eight per cent of the MOH staff working on user fee systems worked exclusively on those systems. The remaining 72% divided their time between their caregiver-related activities and their user fee system-related work. A pro-rated share of the personnel costs of these persons was included in the estimate of the costs. These personnel costs do not constitute additional direct outlays that the MOH pays in order to operate these systems. Rather, these are the opportunity costs of persons who are already paid staff and who are devoting a proportion of their time that would otherwise have been spent providing or assisting in the provision of patient care. The total annual costs of the user fee administrative system in 1999 is estimated to be 23 million lempiras. The MOH paid 81% of this total, 18.7 million lempiras. If only the additional direct outlays that the MOH had to pay in order to operate the institutional user fee systems are included, the cost in 1999 was 11.5 million lempiras.
The administrative costs of institutional fee systems are high relative to the income they generate. Their estimated total annual costs are the equivalent of two-thirds (67%) of their revenues and vary dramatically by type of facility. The magnitude of the cost burden varies from a low of 12% in national and regional hospitals, to 45% in area hospitals and reaches an astonishing 332% in CESAMOs and CESARs. In other words, for each lempira that is generated by the institutional system, in CESAMOs and CESARs 3.32 lempiras are spent to administer the system. For the regions as a whole (i.e. just the area hospitals, CESAMOs and CESARs), administrative costs are 166% of their revenues. That is, for every 1.00 lempira in revenues the Regional Office systems bring in, 1.66 lempiras are spent. Clearly, if the purpose of the institutional user fee system is to contribute to cost recovery, the regions, and particularly and the CESAMOs and CESARs, would be better off without it. Elimination of the institutional fee system in the regions would actually save the MOH money and/or enable its facilities to provide more care.
User fees, fungible resources and incentives: the need for central office leadership and RMRF reform
It is imperative to note that facility directors and administrators point out that user fees are of disproportionately great importance to them (relative to other resources) because these revenues constitute most of the fungible resources that are readily available to them. For the most part, MOH resources are distributed in-kind, leaving relatively little room for the exercise of discretion and the timely purchase of the specific types and quantities of resources that a given facility might need. In contrast, user fees allow MOH staff to purchase exactly what they feel they need (within the rules and regulations relating to their handling) as opposed to, at best, being able to choose from what is available from the MOH, and having to accept the uncertainties of when and if it will actually be delivered. Moreover, they are readily available to meet unanticipated needs as they arise. These important differences may result in a variety of inefficiencies within the MOH system, as administrators may be willing to use substantial amounts of existing MOH resources (e.g. personnel time) to obtain a much smaller value of liquid, fungible user fee revenues. While doing so may be economically irrational from a system perspective, from the individual administrator's/director's perspective it may be entirely rational.
Thus, contrary to the common presumption, decentralization may have encouraged inefficiency. Another source of inefficiency is the practice in some of the facilities that have both institutional and community systems, whereby each has its own separate and distinct administrative system. This duplication adds to the already high administrative costs of these systems, exacerbates inefficiency and further erodes the net revenues they generate.
This incongruity in the way in which user fees and other resources are valued by officials working at different levels of the MOH makes it essential for the central office to demonstrate leadership in promoting and better ensuring the rational use of resources from the MOH's (overall) perspective. The current incentives for irrationally using MOH and GOH resources are also the product of an inadequately defined and inadequately understood administrative structure for both institutional and community user fee systems at the local, regional and central levels of the MOH. The ambiguities concerning the ill-defined roles and responsibilities of the different MOH agents administering the systems have encouraged inaction, which, over time, has come to sap the system -particularly the institutional system -of its dynamism and eviscerated its potential role as a cost recovery mechanism. To the extent to which user fee systems have become more dynamic and more important as cost recovery tools, this has generally occurred where institutional systems have been supplanted by community systems. A substantial proportion of the community systems, however, are of dubious legality due to the total absence (14%) or inadequate level of involvement (30%) of a community health board, the community system's legal sine qua non.
The community systems (legally constituted or otherwise) are not an unmitigated success either, however. There is no guarantee for the representation and participation of facility personnel on the community health boards, and only slightly more than half of facilities with a community user fee system enjoy representation on their board. This is a potentially awkward situation that puts the facility at risk of being subjected to policies that reflect the interests of local leaders, rather than the needs of the health facilities, as has been the experience of other countries pursuing decentralization (c.f. Tang and Bloom 2000) . Health facilities should not be left out of the decision-making process in determining how user fee revenues will be used and made subordinate to persons who are not trained and do not work in health, and who are not knowledgeable about the health facilities' operations. This is a vulnerable position to which MOH staff and facilities should not be subjected. Such a situation is likely to dull the motivation of MOH personnel to collect user fees and thereby undermines a user fee system's performance.
The impact of incentives in such systems is not unlike the situation that existed before the RMRF was passed, when the Ministry of Economy and Finance insisted that user fees redound to the central treasury. With nothing to gain but the ire of their patients who now had to pay for care, Ministry personnel did not collect many revenues. The MOH central office now needs to exercise leadership to review and reform the structure, operations and activities of user fee systems in order to get incentive structures of patients, MOH employees and participating community personnel 'right' to increase equity and efficiency and, more generally, to reinvigorate these systems so that they are better able to realize their cost recovery potential. This work should start with a revision of the RMRF that more carefully defines the parameters governing the systems -especially the community user fee systems -and that more generally reviews and reassesses the goals and the role of the MOH in Honduran society.
MOH employees' views of the institutional user fee systems
MOH employees at facilities with institutional fee systems were asked whether they felt the RMRF should be modified. Without exception, all of the interviewees of institutional systems responded affirmatively. When asked specifically what part of the Regulation was problematic, more than 60% of the respondents cited the various nominal lempiraspecified restrictions (see Table 4 ). In addition, between onethird and one-half of respondents cited each of the five conditions established by the Regulation for exempting patients from payment. MOH staff were then asked an openended question about what they thought were the most critical problems of their user fee system. By far the most common concern (expressed by 61% of respondents) was one or more RMRF-imposed restriction (see Table 5 ). This was followed by concerns involving an operating procedure or management issue, independent of the RMRF -the most common such response was the lack of support they received from the MOH. Inadequate levels of financing, including low user fee levels, was the next most commonly cited key user fee system problem, identified by 20% of the respondents. Concerns about the transparency of the system were cited by 16% of the interviewees. The MOH Regional Office interviewees' responses to this same open-ended question focused almost exclusively on the Regulation.
Community participation and community views of the user fee systems
As noted earlier, there are three organization forms of community participation: the community health board, the municipal health committee and the patronato health committee. There is substantial community participation in the health sector of Honduras, although the mode and level of participation varies substantially over time and place. Seventy-nine per cent of the 186 facilities surveyed reported that they had at least one form of community participation and 27% had more than one.
The most common of the three forms of community participation is the community health board. This is generally a body of eight elected officials who meet fairly regularly (most commonly about once a month), and are involved in the day-to-day operations of the local facility. Generally the Board has been elected and, with no terms of office, its composition generally does not change, although over time its size is likely to be eroded by attrition. A municipal health committee is usually a working group that has been appointed by the mayor. Fifty-eight per cent of the surveyed facilities receive some type of assistance from their municipal government. Although municipalities with a municipal health committee are more likely to provide assistance to their local health facilities, many municipalities without such a committee do so as well. The average surveyed facility received nearly 15 000 lempiras of support from its municipal government in the previous year. Patronato health committees are generally the least formal mode and are comprised of a group of self-appointed persons who generally meet fairly infrequently and usually are most interested in supporting capital expenditures as opposed to the recurrent costs of their local facility. Table 6 shows the types of activities, and their frequency, each of the three different forms of community participation engage in.
Neither community health boards nor municipal health committees appear to be well informed about their local facilities' institutional user fee systems. When the 87 boards and 56 committees surveyed were asked what were the problems of the institutional fee systems, more than 70% responded they did not know. Members of the committees seem to be no better informed about their local facilities' community user fee systems. Sixty-nine per cent reported they did not know what were the problems of the community systems, whereas 5% responded that there are no problems. In contrast, only 20% of the boards' representatives reported that they did not know, while 35% indicated they had no problems (see the top portion of Table 7 .) The MOH facility staff's views of the community systems (presented in the lower portion of Table  7 ) are similar to those of the community health board interviewees. Forty-four per cent of them indicated the community system did not have any problems. The most frequently cited problems are a variety of what are regarded as shortcomings of the community health board (together summing to nearly one-third of the facilities with community systems). In sum, it appears that the community fee systems are generally regarded by MOH facility staff, as well as by community health boards, as less problematic, better functioning systems.
Although many municipal governments are actively supporting MOH facilities, the majority of facility representatives interviewed in this study expressed reservations and generally did not support the idea of having the municipal government take the place of the regional office as the supervisor of local user fee systems. Their reservations appear to reflect two related concerns: (1) as presently structured, MOH facilities are not guaranteed, and usually do not have, representation on municipal health committees, and (2) the fear that they will lose control over the revenues their user fee system generates. These are important and legitimate concerns, but both could be obviated by establishing laws that (1) ensure MOH facility representation on municipal Table 5 . Key problems of the institutional user fee system: MOH facility staff responses to an open-ended question (includes only respondents who work at an MOH facility with an institutional user fee system, multiple responses were possible) health committees and (2) earmark user fee revenues for expenditures on MOH facility operations. These observations and the overlapping jurisdictions of the four different forms of community participation suggest the need for a systematic review of community participation and for more clearly demarcating roles, responsibilities, structures and operating procedures of the various vehicles of community participation so as to better ensure that they are well and widely understood, consistent and mutually supportive of their local MOH facility.
Summary and conclusions
Honduras' passage of the RMRF in 1990 was an important step in the development of the MOH. It has served the MOH well. It generated revenues for health facilities, called for protecting the poor and promoted decentralization. As this study has made clear, however, there are many shortcomings related to both the RMRF and to the implementation of MOH user fee systems. After 10 years, these shortcomings are becoming increasingly restrictive and counterproductive to cost recovery efforts. Moreover, the way these systems function is inequitable. Today, the key issue is not whether or not there should be user fees, but rather, how the user fee system can be made to function better. MOH employees and the general public need to better understand the intended purpose and the design of the Ministry's user fee system and how it is supposed to function. Fee levels need to be increased and the poor need to be better protected. The systems -and especially the community versions -need to be made more formal, with more explicitly established goals, operating rules and procedures so that they are more effective in recovering Table 6 . Community participation by type of activity and type of participation vehicle costs and encouraging decentralization and community participation in a manner that obviates conflict, promotes transparency, and yet protects the resources, operations and integrity of the local health facility's operations.
The Honduran experience demonstrates that decentralized user fee systems are not necessarily equitable user fee systems. The gains that can be realized from decentralization are not automatic. They must be anticipated, planned for and cultivated by a well-designed and well-implemented decentralization initiative. Moreover, as Peterson (1997) has urged, decentralization should not be regarded as consisting of a single, one-time event. It requires on-going work; developing institutions and roles, and then modifying and fine-tuning those roles and responsibilities as feedback and changing priorities and circumstances deem appropriate.
Endnotes
1 At the time of the study, the exchange rate was US$1.00 = 14.6 lempiras.
2 Evidence from the 1998 household health interview survey found an even more disquieting relationship between the proportion of income paid and household income quintile, further underscoring concern about the inequity of the current system. Using the same measure, the average amount paid (per admission) as a percentage of income multiplied by 100, the poorest quintile paid the highest proportion, 499 (i.e. nearly 5% of their annual household income), 3.5 times more than the overall average, and 62 times more than the highest income quintile's 8 (Fiedler 2001) . 3 It is important to recognize that user fees are but one component of health care financing, and that there are other means available for addressing the problems that originally motivated the introduction of user fees, as well as perceived their inadequacies and inequities. It would be possible, for instance, to pool revenues across health areas or health regions, to ameliorate these inadequacies or inequities. An alternative or possibly complementary approach might be to modify the Ministry's resource allocation criteria to explicitly take into account variations in revenue-generating potential by, for instance, allocating relatively more funds to poorer regions.
